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Abstract: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are increasingly important in critical areas of our society 
such as intelligent power grids, next generation mobile devices, and smart buildings. CPS operation 
has characteristics including considerable heterogeneity, variable dynamics, and high complexity. 
These systems have also scarce resources in order to satisfy their entire load demand, which can be 
divided into data processing and service execution. These new characteristics of CPSs need to be 
managed with novel strategies to ensure their resilient operation. Towards this goal, we propose an 
SDN-based solution enhanced by distributed Network Function Virtualization (NFV) modules 
located at the top-most level of our solution architecture. These NFV agents will take orchestrated 
management decisions among themselves to ensure a resilient CPS configuration against threats, 
and an optimum operation of the CPS. For this, we study and compare two distinct incentive 
mechanisms to enforce cooperation among NFVs. Thus, we aim to offer novel perspectives into the 
management of resilient CPSs, embedding IoT devices, modeled by Game Theory (GT), using the 
latest software and virtualization platforms. 
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1. Introduction 
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is essentially a physical facility with embedded sensors and 
actuators that can be remotely monitored and controlled by computerized systems [1], which we 
assume here are distributed virtualized agents (e.g. NFVs), most of them located at the network edge. 
The monitoring and control of CPS are made by logical control loops over physical communication 
channels. These channels are established between the sensors/actuators and the NFVs. The channels 
transfer data representing the facility status and control messages to change the operation mode. 
CPSs are increasingly found in diverse applications areas such as power grids [2][3], smart buildings 
[4][5], next-generation mobile communication systems [6][7], healthcare systems [8][9], and precision 
farming systems [10][11].        
Each NFV agent should take individual decisions based on some system contextual information. 
Nevertheless, each NFV agent has unique contextual information which may be different from what 
is available to others. Consequently, each NFV agent could make management decisions conflicting 
with the decisions from others. Thus, counter-balancing the flexibility of a distributed NFV approach, 
the CPS may have a sub-optimal performance when compared to centralized decision-making. This 
optimization inefficiency of the distributed management is like a system cost, representing a 
degradation of the CPS performance. To mitigate this performance degradation induced by the 
competition among NFV agents, we argue in favor of the utilization of a system mechanism to 
incentivize the cooperation and support orchestration amongst them. 
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This paper proposes and analyzes several incentives mechanisms for cooperation among 
virtualized agents to let them decide on a set of orchestrated management decisions that would 
enable resilient system operation in the presence of a serious threat or challenge. We also discuss 
reactive and proactive CPS orchestration mechanisms among the agents towards the fulfilment of 
global system goals. The paper has the following structure. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 
3 presents a design of a software-defined resilient CPS. Section 4 evaluates our proposal. Section 5 
concludes the paper and outlines future research. The paper’s logical organization is visualized in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Logical Roadmap Behind the Paper 
2. Related Work 
The work in [12] presents a fundamental background in resilience and related concepts. It also 
offers a comprehensive discussion on diverse relevant scenarios for CPSs and on foundational 
technologies to enforce resilience in CPSs. Specifically, the authors of [13] discuss the state of the art 
in resilient networked systems.  
Modern CPSs can be treated as large-scale heterogeneous distributed systems. In this context, 
when adequate supervision and control are also required for network-wide resilience, it is crucial to 
study the efficient orchestration [14] of a set of software-based services that must cooperate among 
themselves to fulfil the global resilience requirements [15]. Some software-based services that are 
pertinent to enforce wide-area resilient networked systems are pointed out in [15], such as traffic 
classification, anomaly detection, or traffic shaping. 
The analysis of a resilient CPS can be made using a theoretical model. A very popular tool to 
perform system analysis is Game theory (GT) [16]. It is very useful for analyzing the diverse situations 
that could impair the system’s normal operation. GT also enables the design of automatic models 
with either bounded rationality or decision uncertainty to safeguard the system’s key functionalities 
in spite of the occurrence of serious threats [17]. In addition, the diverse model players should not 
only optimize their individual outcomes, but they should also coordinate among themselves towards 
the fulfilment of common global system goals. In our opinion, the efficient coordination among 
players can be globally guaranteed by correct incentives endorsed by the model players for them to 
cooperate among themselves. Aligned with these ideas, we have reviewed the literature for 
theoretical models in CPSs that incentivize cooperation among the players. This cooperation is 
fundamental to resilient CPSs, and it is discussed below. 
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The authors of [18] provide an in-depth literature review in sustainable incentives for mobile 
crowdsensing, discussing auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation proposals. In contrast, [19] 
introduces a novel approach for mobile crowdsensing, viz. a social incentive mechanism, which 
incentivizes the coordinated positive contributions towards global system goals from the social 
friends of participants who perform sensing via their mobile devices. 
In [18] the authors discuss the relevance of contract theory to design incentive mechanisms for 
use cases in wireless networks such as traffic offloading, spectrum trading, or mobile crowdsourcing. 
We have found a considerable number of contributions addressing incentive models for 
cooperation among players in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) to study the evolution of 
players’ behavior (selfish vs. cooperative) under different network conditions [20][21], to motivate 
nodes to act as communication relays [22][23], and to influence nodes to support QoS-based 
communications [24]. A related survey is available in [25], which discusses several mechanisms to 
enforce cooperation – punishment based, misbehavior detection based, and mobile social networking 
based. 
Further models to enforce cooperation within a system are as follows: i) hierarchical model 
[26][27][28]; ii) evolutionary model [29]; iii) cluster-based model [30]; and iv) potential game model 
[31][32]. In addition to these games, there is a mechanism design (or reverse GT) solution normally 
designated as auction model [33][34], which finds the optimum system status with a convergence 
time lower than that of a theoretical game [35]. Alternatively to the previous mechanisms which are 
based on (reverse) GT, [36] proposes an incentive mechanism based on both the anchoring effect and 
loss aversion of Behavioral Economics to stimulate data offloading in IoT use cases. The anchoring 
effect can be particularly useful, in the start of model game, when the players have not yet learned 
more suitable choices. In this way, the players are initially attracted to select a choice that optimizes 
the system operation (e.g. enforce nodes to perform data offloading across the existing edge 
computational resources, considering also the energy consumption / availability in each node). 
The authors of [37] propose a virtual (based on NFV) and dynamic control (based on SDN) 
architecture. They deploy, at the SDN controller, a centralized non-cooperative incomplete 
information game. This enables the SDN controller to decide how the virtual (NFV) sensors are 
organized in clusters and to identify the more suitable sleep mode for each sensor. The final aim is to 
extend the lifetime of a software-defined CPS. Our current work is similar to [37] except the latter is 
concerned with energy efficiency and the former is towards the more efficient coordination among 
virtualized agents for supporting the CPS resilience in a more generic way. In addition, [38] is about 
a software-defined solution but without NFV. The authors of [39] survey the state of the art on the 
application of SDN and NFV to IoT use cases. In addition, [40] proposes a taxonomy of the evolution 
of the NFV/SDN relationship. Further, [41] reviews the literature on emerging SDN and NFV 
mechanisms for IoT Systems but mainly focused on the security aspects and not addressing the 
resilience feature. 
The next section presents our basic design for a software-defined resilient CPS. It also discusses 
two more specific design options to orchestrate agent modules running over the SDN controller. The 
first option offers a reactive agent orchestration, and the second one a proactive agent orchestration. 
3. Design of a Resilient Cyber-Physical System 
This section discusses the design of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) to enhance this with extra 
capabilities to detect, absorb and recover, and adapt against threats against the normal operation of 
each CPS [42]. We also discuss reactive and proactive orchestration mechanisms among the several 
CPS management entities towards the resilient operation of that CPS. 
3.1. Design of a Software-Defined Resilient Cyber-Physical System 
The current sub-section discusses some design aspects that are important to consider in a 
Software-Defined resilient CPS. Table I presents a four-layered hierarchical architecture [12], which 
can detect, absorb and recover, and adapt to threats made against CPSs [42]. Further details on this 
architecture are available in [12]. 
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Table I. Hierarchical Architecture of a Software-Defined Resilient Cyber-Physical System [12] 
Layer Plane Domain CPS 
Activity [42] 
Goals Tools 
4 Intelligent 
management 
Inter/Intra Adapt Reasoning, 
orchestration, 
full abstraction, 
adjust 
management 
policies or 
intents 
NFV, SDN, GT, Intent 
Engine, ML/AI 
3 Control Intra Adapt, 
recover 
Partial 
abstraction, 
topology, traffic 
Software-Defined 
Controller with link 
layer discovery,  
forwarding, and 
feedback loop 
2 Switching Edge Detect, 
absorb, 
recover 
Decision about 
next link 
decision, traffic 
mirroring, 
discard packet  
OpenFlow rules in 
local device tables, 
queues 
1 Physical 
communications 
IoT Detect, 
absorb 
Accept or 
discard received 
message 
Interface Chip 
programming 
The next sub-section debates the modeling of a software-defined resilient CPS, which is 
managed in a reactive way by each management agent. 
3.2. Design of a Reactive Software-Defined Resilient CPS Management Mechanism 
We discuss here the modeling of a solution to manage a resilient CPS in a reactive way. This 
solution has a four-layered design (see Table I). In addition, Figure 2 presents the key functional 
blocks of the system under investigation. Analyzing this, one can conclude that the CPS status is 
being supervised in a periodic way by the SDN controller via a Southbound API protocol such as 
OpenFlow (see Figure 2, message 1). Then, the SDN controller, acting as an intermediary, exchanges 
REST messages via Northbound API with the topmost level system agents (e.g. NFV modules). Using 
these messages, the SDN controller reports status events associated with the CPS operation. These 
events are analyzed, classified and processed. The agent decision depends on the processing of all 
the received events (see message 3, Figure 2). After, the agent decision is transferred to the SDN 
controller. Finally, the SDN controller converts the received management decision into flow rules 
that control the CPS physical infrastructure, also commonly referred as CPS data plane (see message 
5, Figure 2).  
The agent processing represented in Figure 2 as “Layer 4: Service Management”, and shown in 
the topmost line of Table II, it is now briefly explained. Each individual agent estimates the system 
status from received event messages. The system status is evaluated as the ratio between the 
Quantity_good_events and the Quantity_total_events, both collected in a periodic way. There is also the 
estimator Sn, which is the system status at instant “n”. This agent system status estimator with 
memory (i.e. configurable parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1]) enables that agent to identify in the best way possible 
an eventual system anomaly and, after that, to react in a cooperative way to that issue. This means 
that the recover or adapt algorithm is executed by a specific agent if that agent decides to cooperate 
and if that choice has been randomly sorted out by the same agent – like tossing a coin. In addition, 
all the previous goals should be achieved by minimizing the usage of (heterogeneous) system 
resources (e.g. energy, bandwidth). Alternatively, the agent can selfishly select the ‘defect’ strategy. 
As the players select their strategies to optimize the system status, they then verify how the system 
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behaves by evaluating the subsequent value for the local estimator of the system status, and the local 
processing in each agent is repeated as already explained. In parallel, the global system management 
is hopefully enhanced, increasing its robustness against any outcoming menace. 
Event analysis: 
classification and 
processing
Event-triggered 
management 
decision
Layer 4: Service 
Management
Layer 3: SDN 
Controller
Layer 1: CPS
1- CPS status
2- CPS status (event) 4- Management
3- Event processing
5- Control
 
Figure 2. System Functional Blocks with monitor, classify, manage, and control messages  
 
Table II. Agent Event-Triggered Reactive Management Algorithm  
𝑆0 = 1; 𝛼 = 0.8; n = 1 
While True do 
    Collect, analyze, and classify CPS events occurred within last time slot 
    𝑆 =
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑡
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑡
 
    𝑆𝑛 = 𝑆𝑛−1 ∗  𝛼 + 𝑆 ∗ (1 −  𝛼) 
    𝒊𝒇 𝑆𝑛 > 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 
        CPS system is ok; do nothing different from last action 
    else 
        CPS system is not ok; play the cooperate / defect game 
    end if 
    n = n + 1 
end for 
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The next sub-section presents the basic design of a proactive software-defined resilient CPS 
management mechanism. 
3.3. Design of a Proactive CPS Management Mechanism 
This sub-section briefly debates how data analysis can also influence the CPS operation 
proactively. Figure 3 visualizes the CPS flowchart, showing the major functional phases of gathering 
data about the CPS operation (status), analyzing data, selecting a management decision, and applying 
the management decision on the CPS. After this iteration, more CPS data is gathered again, and the 
previous functional phases are repeated. We assume that data analysis can be performed using a 
machine learning algorithm to boost the system management [43]. In addition, the management 
decision of this data model should be conveniently matched with the event-triggered management 
decision of the agent discussed in sub-section 3.2. The orchestration among the two management 
methodologies (reactive vs proactive) can be made using a Blockchain solution [44], using a suitable 
consensus algorithm. Consensus algorithms, such as Kalman-based distributed algorithms [45], can 
provide interesting distributed functionalities of both filtering the menaces and manage CPSs to 
mitigate them (or even avoid them in the future). In this way, important network functions, e.g. 
firewall or Intrusion Detection/Prevention or honeypots, can be deployed pervasively within large 
networking edge domains, embedding a considerable number of sensors, actuators, or data 
aggregators. The authors of [45] discuss key recent results in the field of industrial CPSs modeled by 
differential dynamic equations, and they further discuss what issues should be addressed. These 
issues are analyzed from three distinct aspects: distributed filtering, distributed control and, 
distributed security control and filtering.  
The next section models and analyzes a software-defined resilient CPS using an external 
mechanism to enforce cooperation among players through iterated repetitions of a non-cooperative 
game. The coordination among players can establish some orchestration among them towards a more 
efficient CPS global management, meaning the available CPS resources are efficiently used.  
Begin
Data 
Collection
Change Last 
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Decision?
Data 
Analysis
New 
Management 
Decision
Applying 
Management 
Decision
Store New 
Management 
Decision
YesNo
 
Figure 3. Data-triggered Management Model of a Cyber-Physical System 
4. Analysis of a Software-Defined Resilient Cyber-Physical System 
This section discusses a non-cooperative model enhanced by an external mechanism, for 
enforcing cooperation among players reactively through infinitely iterated repetitions of the model. 
The cooperation within players is very important for achieving reliable system operation with a 
limited set of resources. To support the next debate, we consider an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) game between two players. These players are two functional entities of a CPS and IoT 
system, e.g. containers, NFV, or specialized agents located at the topmost layer of the software-
defined resilient CPS. By specialized agents we mean that, as the system overlaps a specific threshold, 
each system agent detects it and cooperatively reacts, selecting either ‘absorb’ or ‘adapt to’ the 
problem. Alternatively, the agent can be selfish by doing nothing to mitigate the problem. 
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Next, we analyze a model involving two topmost layer management agents that can either 
cooperate or defect. In the current game, the discounted factor combined with a mechanism that is 
triggered by a player´s defection can enforce cooperation throughout players. The discounted factor 
(<= 1) multiplies the payoffs of the current stage, meaning that in future game stages the payoffs of 
previous rounds have less relevance.  
Figure 4 shows the payoff matrix of an infinitely repeated PD game as well as the total (per 
player accumulated) payoff along the initial four runs of the game, considering distinct values for the 
discounted factor (i.e. delta= {0,.2,.6,.95}). A Grim Trigger methodology is applied to a player that 
defects. Two distinct strategies are analyzed. In the first situation, both players cooperate, being 
rewarded with the social optimum payoff of 3 in every stage of the game, as shown in (1). In the 
second situation, one player defects in the first stage to increase its initial payoff from 3 to 5. 
Nevertheless, the other player at the second stage retaliates against the former defecting player, also 
defecting. Consequently, both players get a payoff of 1, as shown in (2), after the initial stage.  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝 = 3 + 𝛿. 3 + 𝛿2. 3 + ⋯ =
3
1 − 𝛿
 
 
 
(1) 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑓 = 5 + 𝛿. 1 + 𝛿2. 1 + ⋯ = 5 +
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
 
 
 
(2) 
 
3
1 − 𝛿
≥ 5 +
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
⇔ 𝛿 ≥ 0.5 
 
 
(3) 
 
The expression (3) evaluates the minimum value (i.e. 0.5) for the discounted factor (delta) to 
reflect in future a strong enough threat (in terms of payoff decrease) to a deviating player. Comparing 
the payoff trends of the two cases we have discussed in the previous paragraph, one can conclude 
for delta values of 0 (i.e. the game has only a single stage) and 0.2, which are both lower than 0.5, then 
the more convenient strategy for both players is always to defect (see Figure 4). The mutual defection 
occurs because the model gives the players solid evidence that they are playing the ultimate round 
of the game. So, the players are normally tempted to defect as they cannot be punished in the future. 
Alternatively, analyzing from Figure 4 the trends associated with the delta values of 0.6 and 0.95, 
which are both higher than 0.5, one can conclude that in the initial stages both players are tempted to 
defect; but after a threshold stage of the game is passed, both players should always cooperate in 
their best interest. This threshold stage depends on the delta value (see Figure 4). In fact, as the delta 
value increases towards one that means the player (with that perspective of the game) learns it is 
better to cooperate instead defecting faster, i.e. after fewer stages counted from the game’s start.  
The opposite happens if for the same game the strategy is changed from Tit for Tat (Figure 4) to 
Slow Tit for Two Tats (Figure 5). From Figure 5 it is evident that the need to cooperate occurs in later 
stages of the game when compared with the trend of Figure 4. The last difference in behavior occurs 
because Tit for Two Tats is a forgiving strategy by which a player only defects after the opponent has 
defected twice in a row. This behavior is fairer than Tit for Tat in scenarios where the player, due to 
a network communication error or any limitation imposed by other system operational constrain, 
erroneously perceived the previous opponent’s choice.  
For validating the key conclusions extracted from the previous analytical comparison made 
between the two cooperative strategies, we have performed some additional simulations to study 
how the distribution of the two studied types of cooperative behavior evolve along the time, 
considering a total player population of constant size. In this way, Figure 6 shows the evolution of a 
population composed by the two types of players of our study, during one thousand rounds. The 
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Moran process was used to keep the population size always at a constant value of one hundred 
players. For simulating that situation, we have used the Axelrod Python library 1 . The winning 
strategy was Slow Tit for Two Tats, suggesting Tit for Tat has a lower fitness function than the former 
one, confirming our analytical conclusions.  
There are still a considerable number of open research issues in discounted repeated games, such 
as follows: i) study scenarios with myopic information; ii) payoff variations (controlling players 
defection); iii) considering a distinct delta per player; iv) triggering punishment only during a limited 
set of stages (i.e. forgiving after T stages following a deviating behavior); v) studying scenarios where 
the end of the game at the current round (with probability 1-delta) due to the absence of cooperation 
among players could alternatively be related to the probability of the occurrence of a serious system 
threat at the current round, stopping the system’s operation and the game. Also, the authors of [46] 
analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated PD games, reaching some promising 
results. Their results suggest that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to 
arise when it occurs in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in 
equilibrium does not imply that most players will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only 
when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic 
uncertainty. Another recent contribution [47] suggests the usage of statistical physics to understand 
human cooperation better. We think that this research direction is very interesting to transpose to an 
investigation on how to design and deploy systems used by diverse players, which need to be more 
cooperative and fairer in the mutual interaction within each system. Further, the cooperation and 
fairness should be obtained not by centralized policies that can often be either unoptimized or be 
easily deceived by (some) players, but simply by a higher level of collective intelligence stemming 
from each player. 
The current section has used static rewards for the strategies each player is able to select. It is 
also possible to analyze a more dynamic game, where the reward of each player is a function of the 
estimator Sn used by the algorithm of Table II.  
 
 
Figure 4. Total Payoff Trend for a specific player involved in an Infinitely Repeated PD Game 
with a Grim Punishment Mechanism (Tit for Tat) and Diverse Discounted Factors 
                                                 
1 https://github.com/Axelrod-Python/Axelrod (Verified in 2019/04/21) 
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Figure 5. Total Payoff Trend for a specific player involved in an Infinitely Repeated PD Game 
with a Grim Punishment Mechanism (Slow Tit for Two Tats) and Diverse Discounted Factors 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of the Two Studied Types of Cooperative Behavior in a Constant 
Population of 100 Players during 1,000 Rounds (STFTT – Slow Tit For Two Tats; TFT – Tit For Tat) 
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5. Conclusion and Future Work 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are increasingly important in very important areas of our society 
but are subject to new challenges to their optimum and reliable operation, which strongly suggests 
the need for innovative management strategies to achieve resilience in these systems. To this end, we 
have proposed an SDN-based solution based on distributed Network Function Virtualization (NFV) 
modules. These NFV modules take orchestrated management decisions among themselves to ensure 
a resilient CPS configuration against threats and an optimum operation of the CPSs. In this paper, we 
design, model and compare distinct incentive mechanisms to enforce cooperation among NFVs.  
Future work will involve studying data-triggered management models for building 
programmable resilient and smart CPSs [48]. In addition, the dynamic movement of processes and 
data in (edge) cloud-based systems may compromise their resilience, unless steps are taken to 
recognize the problem and modify anomaly detection components appropriately [49]. 
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